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asserts that small business lenders’ profitability will be lower than other more diversified
banks. Using the rate of return on assets as the profit measure, we find that small business
exposure tends to have neutral or positive effects on bank profitability after taking into account
bank risk. Using efficient frontier analyses that focus on the rate of return on equity, we find
that small business lenders reap benefits from specialization, particularly in terms of reducing
failure risk. We conclude that the evidence supports the specialization hypothesis.
Introduction
Small banks have traditionally been the largest supplier of credit to small business firms
in the United States [see Kolari and Zardkoohi (1986, 1997) and Jayaratne and Wolken (1999)].
In recent years there has been concern that changes in the banking industry, including
consolidation via mergers and acquisitions, internet banking, and deregulation allowing new
combinations of banks and other financial service companies, will adversely affect small banks
and associated small business lending [e.g., see Berger and Udell (1995), Peek and Rosengren
(1998), Ely and Robinson (2001), Keeton (2001), and Whalen (2001)]. Recognizing these
trends, in 1993 the four bank regulatory agencies made changes in supervisory policy to allow
banks to place greater weight on “character” (as opposed to financial strength based on
accounting statements) when making loans to small business firms [see Hooks and Opler
(1994)].
Other research has found no reason to believe that small business credit would be
affected by banking consolidation. Strahan and Weston (1997) reported evidence that
consolidation among small banks leads to an increase in small business lending. Berger,
Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1997) reported similar findings in response to small bank
mergers. Also, they found that small business lending may increase as bank size and
complexity increases. These results contradict concerns that small business firms would not be
able to access credit from large banking institutions; indeed, they surmised that small business
credit supplies could increase in response to banking deregulation due to greater lending per
dollar of assets in the banking industry. Other work by Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) reported
that small business firms did not have greater access to credit in areas with many small banks.
Moreover, Craig and João Cabral dos Santos (1998) did not find any clear relationship between
small business lending and mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry, while Avery and
Samolyk (2003) report evidence that community bank consolidations was associated with
higher small business lending. In sum, studies are mixed on the question of whether small
business firms will experience problems in obtaining adequate credit supplies from banks in the
future.
In this paper we test two competing research hypotheses concerning how small business
lending affects bank profitability per unit risk. The specialization hypothesis argues for higher
profitability per unit risk as banks increasingly focus on small business lending. Alternatively,
the diversification hypothesis asserts that profitability per unit risk will decrease as banks
specialize in small business lending. If small business lending lowers profitability per the
diversification hypothesis, it is reasonable to infer that bank consolidation resulting in larger,
more diversified organizations and fewer numbers of small, specialized lenders [see Samolyk
(1994)] will tend to diminish credit supplies to small business firms. On the other hand,
evidence in favor of the specialization hypothesis would favor continued bank credit flows to
small business firms. If small business lending has no effect on bank profitability, after
controlling for risk of small business exposure, neither of these research hypotheses can be
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accepted. In this case the implication to small business credit supplies would be mixed and no
clear inferences can be drawn.
To assess the profitability and riskiness of small business lenders in the U.S. banking
industry, we conduct a variety of empirical tests. Small business loans are defined to be less
than $250,000, as reported on the Call Reports of Income and Condition. Data is collected for
individual banks from Call Reports for the period 1994-2001. To compare how small business
lending differentially affects the financial performance of small and large banks, we group
banks according to the following five different asset sizes: (1) less than $100 million (very
small), (2) $100-$300 million (small), (3) $300-$500 million (medium), (4) $500 million - $3
billion (large), and (5) greater than $3 billion (very large). Empirical analyses are divided into
two parts: (1) multivariate panel regression tests on the relationship between small business
lending and banks’ profitability as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA), and (2)
efficient frontier analyses that seek to examine how small business lending affects banks’ rate
of return on equity (ROE) and associated capital risk. Efficient frontiers are estimated for
different types of specialized lenders to comparatively examine the risk and return
characteristics of small business lenders with those of other specialized and diversified lenders.
Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2002) have observed that using banks for the study of
diversification versus focus in asset allocation has advantages over nonfinancial corporations.1
The main advantage is that banks can achieve focus and diversification relatively easily by
changing loan exposures to industries. Additionally, the use of sector decomposition in the
Call Report enables us to mitigate the problem of business unit identification in a firm. In this
regard, studies of the relationship between diversification and value suffer from an endogeneity
problem. That is, the diversification discount is caused by fundamental differences in the
characteristics of firms that choose to diversify compared to those that choose to remain
focused, rather than by diversification activity per se. Observation of the link between banks’
returns and their asset composition over time is not exposed to this potential problem.
In brief, our empirical results indicate that after taking into account bank risk, small
business lending generally has either neutral or positive ROA profit effects across different
bank size groups. Also, small business lenders tend to have higher ROE profits per unit risk
than more diversified lenders, due primarily to lower bank failure risk. The latter finding is
interestingly because it contradicts the common belief that small business lending is risky
relative to other types of lending. We conclude that the empirical evidence supports the
specialization hypothesis, rather than the diversification hypothesis. If larger, more diversified
organizations are the future of the banking industry, an important implication of our findings is
that small business lending can play a positive role in terms of contributing to both bank
profitability and failure risk reduction. As such, despite the on-going consolidation movement
in the U.S. banking industry, banks likely will continue to play a central role in the provision of
small business credit.
The next section overviews related empirical and theoretical literature. Section 2
describes our research methodology, including data and empirical models. Section 3 reports
and discusses our empirical results. Section 4 gives the conclusion.

1

In comparisons between diversification versus focus, studies using corporate financial data have documented
focus as a value enhancing strategy [Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Desai and Jain
(1999)].
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I.

Related Literature
Small business loans are no doubt riskier than large business loans due to the greater
likelihood that small firms will fail and subsequently default on their outstanding debt. Banks
can mitigate this higher loan risk and earn fair profits by forming relationships with small
business firms that enable them to closely monitor small firm borrowers and flexibly
renegotiate contractual terms as needed to increase payment probabilities [see Berlin (1994)].
For these reasons banks will tend to specialize in a particular credit area to take advantage of
management expertise. Alternatively, in order to reduce risk and thereby increase the
profitability of small business lending, banks can diversify into other loan areas. In this way
losses in one area of lending can be offset by gains in other areas, which tends to smooth profits
and reduce risk. We next review selected empirical studies as well as theoretical studies that
have attempted to examine how specializing in small business loans affects bank profitability.
A.
Empirical Studies
Kimball (1997) compared small banks specializing in small business loans less than
$100,000 with a matched sample of small banks with low levels of small business lending.
Most of these banks were located in small towns with populations less than 15,000. Small
business lending banks had 40 percent or more of their assets in small business loans as of both
June 1995 and June 1996. Semi-annual comparisons for the period December 1991 to June
1996 of the two bank groups’ asset portfolios, liability structures, revenues and expenses, profit
rates, standard deviation of profit rates, and probabilities of insolvency were reported. Relative
to the control group of diversified small banks, specialized small business lenders tended to
have higher pre-tax returns and higher volatility of these returns, higher levels of non-interest
expense and provisions for loan losses, higher growth rates, lower capital to asset ratios, higher
proportions of local deposits to total liabilities, and higher probabilities of insolvency in most
periods.
Another study by Kolari, Berney, and Ou (1997) compared small business lending
banks’ profitability and risk to other banks based on June 1994 and June 1995 accounting data.
All insured U.S. banks were stratified into deciles by the proportion of total assets devoted to
small business loans less than $250,000. Banks were further grouped according to asset size:
less than $100 million, $100-$300 million, $300-$500 million, $500 billion-$3 billion, and
greater than $3 billion. Univariate t-tests and multiple regression analyses showed that small
business loans tended to increase bank profitability even after adjusting for risk. This result
was robust to alternative profit measures, including the return on assets, net interest margin, net
interest margin adjusted for loan and lease losses, and return on equity. Also, small business
lenders tended to have higher risk in terms of credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk, and funding
risk compared to banks with little or no small business lending. The multivariate analyses
revealed that, holding risk factors constant, small business lending either had a neutral or
positive effect on small banks’ profitability.
Previous work by Liang and Savage (1990) examined specialized nonbank lenders in
bank holding companies, including commercial finance, mortgage banking, consumer finance,
and leasing. These specialized lenders tended to have higher but more variable return on assets
(ROA) and higher capital ratios than their more diversified bank counterparts. Also, using
ROA and its variability, in addition to the equity to assets ratio, the authors estimated
probabilities of insolvency and found that nonbank specialized lenders had higher failure
chances than diversified bank lenders.
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Related work by Eisenbeis and Kwast (1991) compared different types of specialized
bank lenders in the area of real estate (i.e., low-risk residential mortgages, high-risk
commercial real estate, and very risky real estate development) to a control group of diversified
banks. Banks were required to have at least 40 percent of their assets in real estate loans in at
least one year between 1978 and 1988 to be included in the sample. They found that
specialized real estate lenders tended to have higher proportions of loans to assets, lower loan
losses, high non-interest expenses, and a lower probability of insolvency than more diversified
banks. These results favor the specialization hypothesis.
Another study by Laderman, Schmidt, and Zimmerman (1991) found that asset
diversification of agricultural and nonagricultural lenders increased after statewide branching
was permitted. They concluded that intrastate branching enabled banks to spread asset risks
and thereby reduce the probability of failure in the banking industry. Consistent with
Laderman et al., work by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) indicated that an increase in
geographic expansion by bank holding companies tended to lower failure risk (or increase
aggregate bank safety).
Other studies on specialized lenders by Sinkey and Nash (1993, 1996) examined credit
card banks from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. These banks held at least 75 percent of assets
in credit card loans. When compared to a control group of diversified banks, the results closely
paralleled those of Liang and Savage in support of the diversification hypothesis.
A recent study by Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2002) examined how specialization
versus diversification affected the return and risk of 105 Italian banks in the period 1993-1999.
The authors collected data on individual bank loan exposures to 23 different industries, six
economic sectors (e.g., households, nonfinancial corporations, etc.), and three geographical
regions (i.e., Italy, European Union, and other countries). Diversification was measured using
a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) computed as the sum of squared loans in a category
divided by total loans for all categories. Returns are measured as the return on assets and return
on equity, both computed from balance sheet data, as well as the annual stock return and
market model residual return after taking into account beta risk with respect to the overall
Italian stock market. Risk was measured as doubtful and nonperforming loans/total assets, the
standard deviation of this ratio, and the standard deviation of annual stock returns. Control
variables were asset size, equity capital ratio, number of branch offices/total assets, and number
of employees/total assets. In general, consistent with the specialization hypothesis, they found
that bank return was lower and risk was higher among banks with higher industrial loan
diversification than other banks. This negative diversification effect was greater among high
risk banks. Sectoral diversification was only negative among high risk banks. And,
geographical diversification did increase returns among low risk banks. The authors concluded
that there appears to be diseconomies of diversification for some banks. They also observed
that their findings are consistent with DeLong (2001), who found that focusing mergers in
terms of financial activities and geography tended to improve economic performance more than
diversifying mergers.
Thus, the empirical evidence is mixed with regard to whether or not specialized lenders
are riskier than more diversified lenders. While specialized lenders tend to be relatively more
aggressive, it is not clear that their returns per unit risk are higher than diversified bank lenders.
Given that diversification is a risk-reducing concept in modern portfolio theory, the low risk of
some specialized lenders, such as real estate lenders in the Eisenbeis and Kwast study and small
business lenders in some periods in the Kimball study, remains a puzzle. Also, the higher
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profitability of small business lenders after controlling for risk factors in Kolari, Berney, and
Ou is similarly inconsistent with portfolio theory.
B.
Theoretical Studies
There are a number of motivations for banks to diversify (or not specialize). As
observed by Klein and Saidenberg (1997), agency theory posits that managers can be expected
to diversify to increase job their security, compensation, corporate control, or empire [e.g., see
Amihud (1981) and Born, Eisenbeis, and Harris (1988)]. Also, an economic motivation is that
product and market diversification should help to reduce firm-specific risk of failure [(e.g., see
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990)]. However, this motivation is mitigated to some degree
by the separation principle that shareholders can reproduce bank level diversification by
purchasing shares in different kinds of banks. In our opinion a countervailing force in the
banking industry that diminishes the application of the separation principle is regulatory
pressure to decrease failure risk. Capital requirements and supervisory procedures in banking
are intended to lower failure risk. Finally, diversification may well yield economies of scope
from offering a diverse array of financial services that lower operating costs and attract
customers.
Theoretical work by Winton (1999) has sought to re-examine the debate concerning
whether banks should diversify or specialize their lending activities. It is well known that
diversification tends to reduce the chance of bank failure due to the reduction in variance of
loan returns. However, according to Winton, there are several potential problems inherent in
diversification. First, given the bank has limited human resources, diversification means that
credit is provided in economic and geographic areas outside the bank’s home base. This
expanded lending responsibility can diminish the quality of loan monitoring. Since delegated
monitoring is central to the existence of banks and makes them “special” relative to other
lenders by virtue of their access to private (inside) information about borrowing firms [see
Diamond, (1984), Fama (1980, 1985), Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and others), weaker
monitoring in diversified banks could be a critical factor affecting loan portfolio quality.
Second, the bank likely will lend in areas that have a high downside risk to sector or geographic
downturns. An implication of this problem is that diversification is most beneficial among
banks with only moderate downside risk. Third, diversification may require increased size and
added management to handle the broader risk exposure of the bank. On the other hand,
specialization allows the bank to focus loans in its areas of expertise, thereby contributing to
more effective loan monitoring.
Winton further argued that increasing competition in the banking industry should favor
increased specialization. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that, given low profit margins,
the best strategy is to reduce risk via diversification, his analyses suggest specialization is an
attractive lending strategy due to “winner’s curse” problems (i.e., banks entering markets with
established banks face increased adverse selection difficulties as well as expert local
monitoring of credit risk). In his words, “Loan monitoring improves returns not only by
increasing best-case outcomes but by reducing the frequency and severity of worst-case
outcomes … diversification that lessens monitoring effectiveness may increase the frequency
and severity of worst-case outcomes, increasing failure probability …” (Winton, 1999, p. 3).
He inferred that diversified banks likely require higher capital levels to absorb potentially
higher credit losses than specialized banks. Also, he recommended that future empirical
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studies should consider the impact of diversification and specialization on loan return
distributions.
II.

Research Methodology
We seek to examine how bank specialization in small business lending affects bank
profits per unit risk. As discussed in the previous section, there are two opposing views in this
regard. The specialization hypothesis implies increasing profits per unit risk attributable to
small business lending. The benefits of specialization include management expertise, high
quality monitoring of borrowers, and minimization of diseconomies of scope that raises
operating costs. On the other hand, the diversification hypothesis implies decreasing profits per
unit risk from specialization. Modern portfolio theory would predict that a diversified loan
portfolio reaps the benefit of reduced risk and, holding profit constant, offers a higher profit per
unit risk. Which of these two hypotheses is supported in the case of small business lending? In
this section we describe empirical tests that seek to answer this question.
Small business lending is defined here as all commercial loans under $250,000.
Because there is a strong correlation between business size and loan size, we believe that loans
under $250,000 are most representative of small business loans (i.e., loans under $1,000,000
would no doubt contain many loans made to large firms, and loans under $100,000 would not
capture larger loans to small business firms).
A.
Profit Analyses
Following previous studies, univariate and multivariate profit analyses are performed on
the relationship between small business lending and profit variables. Table I defines the
dependent and independent variables. Also, figures are domestic to exclude U.S. bank
activities in foreign countries. Updating prior studies, quarterly data are collected from the Call
Reports of Income and Condition for all insured U.S. commercial banks for the period 19942001. It should be noted that only the mid-year report contains data on the outstanding small
business loans held by banks.
We define small business lending activity as the ratio of small commercial and
industrial and commercial real estate loans less than $250,000 to total assets (SMALLBUS).
Generally speaking, it is reasonable to believe that individual small business loans are riskier
than loans to larger firms. Smaller firms are less well diversified, have less access to capital
and liquidity, and have more limited management resources than larger firms. Given the higher
risk faced by small business lenders, we expect this variable to be positively associated with
ROA profit measures.
The diversification (DIVERS) measure is the HHI of the loan portfolio (i.e., the sum of
squared ratios of a loan category/total loans for business loans, real estate loans, consumer
loans, and agricultural loans). As such, lower DIVERS implies higher diversification. Hence,
if a bank’s diversification across loan categories increases profitability, this variable will have a
negative coefficient sign.
The risk measures in the present study reflect different dimensions of the on- and offbalance sheet risk of banks. All the measures will be calculated per dollar of total assets. Loan
and lease losses net of recoveries to total assets (LOSS) is the most often cited indicator of
bank risk. Since most banks obtain most of their earnings from the loan portfolio, controlling
credit risk is critical to survival and profitability.
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Total equity capital to total assets (EQUITY), referred to as a measure of overall
leverage by regulators, represents the ownership stake of shareholders in the bank. As
mentioned above, equity is a key risk measure because it serves as a cushion to absorb
unexpected losses. If bank equity falls close to zero, federal regulators can close the institution.
Clearly, higher equity ratios reduce perceived bank capital risk.
Over the last decade, the ratio of off-balance sheet activities to total assets (OFFBAL)
has dramatically increased in the banking industry, especially among multi-billion dollar banks.
These off-balance sheet services (as well as others) enable banks to earn service revenue and
enhance their relationships with clients. However, while they help reduce clients’ risks, they
increase the off-balance sheet risk exposure of the bank.
The next risk measure is inversely related to risk -- namely, the ratio of total securities
to total assets (SECURITIES). By definition, increasing the securities ratio decreases the ratio
of total loans to assets and thereby reduces bank liquidity risk (i.e., securities act as a secondary
reserve for meeting liquidity needs of banks).
The extent to which banks use purchased funds as a proportion of total assets
(PURCHASED) is another measure of risk. Deregulation of interest rates on deposits has
increased the use of purchased funds by banks and, consequently, their ability to change their
funding risk.
Two additional variables are included as control measures in the multivariate regression
analyses -- namely, market structure (or market risk) and bank size. Market structure is proxied
by the well-known Herfindahl index (HHI). Regarding the latter variable, HHI is the sum of
squared ratios of the total assets of the ith bank to the aggregate total assets of all banks in the
SMSA for urban areas or county for other areas. Bank size is simply measured by the log of
total assets (SIZE).
We examine the relationship between ROA and small business lending in a fixedeffects panel regression model2 generally stated as:
ROAit = f (Xit, Yit) + it

(1)

where ROAit is the rate of return on assets (or net income after taxes to total assets), XitJ (Hwan,
subscripts are different from equation) consists of small business lending and diversification
variables, and YItj (Hwan, subscripts are different from equation) represents risk and other
control variables. Previous studies employed cross-sectional regression methods to test the
relationship between small business lending and bank profitability in a particular year. By
contrast, we run fixed-effects regression models using pooled annual data for the years 1994 to
2001. The advantage of this approach is that, by transforming the data into deviations from
firm-specific means and leaving only (Hwan, not sure of wording “leaving only” here – is there
a better way to say this? – perhaps Himmelberg et al. say some words on this point – just use
the same words they use) the time-series variation in the data, the regression model controls for
unmeasured firm characteristics that influence the performance measurement of banks (i.e.,
assumed constant over time via the firm-specific intercept term).

2

See Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) for discussion on the advantages of the fixed effects model (i.e., in
the present case we seek to control for unmeasured bank characteristics that can influence their profitability).
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B.
Efficient Frontier Analyses
Next, we extend previous studies of specialized lenders in banking by employing
modern portfolio analysis methods to assess the riskiness and profitability of banks specializing
in small business lending to other banks specializing in large business, real estate, agriculture,
and consumer loans. The bottom of Table I gives the definitions of these loan specializations.
A mean-variance optimization procedure is used to estimate the efficient frontier for
bank loan portfolios. Rather than using banks’stock rates of return, due to the lack of stock
price data for most banks (with the exception of multi-billion dollar banks), we use quarterly
rates of return on equity (ROE) from balance sheet and income statement data for various
specialized lenders in the period 1994-2001. Specialized lenders are banks in the top decile
among all insured U.S. banks in a particular lending area, including small business, large
business, real estate, consumer, and agricultural loans (see Table I). In larger bank asset size
groups we relaxed this constraint to include banks in deciles six to nine in order to gather
sufficient observations for a particular type of specialized lender (as discussed in the empirical
results section). Additionally, a group of diversified banks with a balanced loan portfolio was
added to the analyses. These banks were in deciles four to six in all loan areas for a given year.
While they are diversified in terms of their loan portfolio, it is possible that they are less
diversified overall than a particular type of specialized lender, who could take advantage of
geographic diversification or diversification within a loan category to reduce risk. The
balanced lender group enables us to determine if the source of diversification benefits to
specialized lenders is attributable to loan diversification versus geographic or other means of
diversification. Finally, a random sample (n = 75) of banks for each size group is selected.
Like the balanced lenders, this bank group is a control group against which to compare other
specialized lenders.
Earlier work by Blair and Heggestad (1978) developed a portfolio theory of bank
investment. They assumed that banks purchase a portfolio of assets with known (subjective)
probability distributions, seek to maximize the expected utility of uncertain profits, are riskaverse, do not have riskless assets available due to interest rate risk, and fail when losses on
assets exceed capital. From Chebychev’s theorem, the probability of uncertain asset earnings
(X) for a bank falling below its capital (C) is at most equal to the probability of X being less
than k standard deviations from E(X). More specifically,
Pr{X < [E(X) - k ]}  1/k2.

(2)

Re-writing equation (2) in terms of the rate of return on equity capital [see Koehn and
Santomero (1980)],
Pr{X/C < [E(X)/C - k /C]}  1/k2.

(3)

Since at bankruptcy -X = -C (or (C – X = 0 net worth), -C = E(X) - k . Dividing by C and
solving for k, k = [E(X)/C + 1]/( /C). Substituting k into equation (3),
Pr[E(X)/C < -1]  ( /C) 2/[E(X)/C + 1] 2,

(4)
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which implies that the probability of bankruptcy is higher per unit of capital the lower the level
of expected asset earnings and the larger the variability of such earnings [see also Haubrich
(1998)].
Figure 1 illustrates the efficient frontier of risky assets available to the small banks. The
point D represents a diversified bank, whereas points SBL, LBL, RE, AG, and CS represent
banks specializing in small business loans, large business loans, real estate loans, agricultural
loans, and consumer loans, respectively. The efficient frontier is based on optimal weighted
average combinations of the specialized banks. Samples of diversified banks (i.e., balanced
bank and random sample bank groups) will be added to the analyses to examine their location
in risk and return space. The slope of lines A and B equals the square root of the reciprocal of
the probability of bank failure in equation (4). The lower the slope of this line, the higher the
probability of bank failure would be. At least in theory, specialized banks should have lower
slopes than diversified banks, as depicted in Figure 1. However, empirical evidence is needed
to determine if this theoretical relationship holds in practice. As discussed in the previous
section, some evidence exists in the empirical literature for specialized lenders earning higher
returns per unit risk than diversified lenders in the banking industry.
To our knowledge, no other studies have pursued the above analyses with meanvariance optimization methods that solve for the efficient frontier. Hughes, Lang, Mester, and
Moon (1996) take a theoretical approach similar to Figure 1, but rather than estimating the
efficient frontier, they estimate a best-practice, risk-return frontier for bank equity via
maximum-likelihood regression techniques. Subsequently, they compare the expected equity
return, efficiency, and safety of banking organizations by regressing these measures on
different variables that proxy geographic diversification. We propose to compute the efficient
frontier for banks in different size groups and then evaluate the diversification of each
specialized lender by comparing their probability of failure to that obtained for a hypothetical
bank with equal expected rate of return. To do this we simply compare the specialized lender
in risk-return space to a bank located on the efficient frontier with equal expected rate of return
on equity. According to modern portfolio theory, diversification does not affect profit rates;
instead, it reduces the risk per unit profit of a lender (or investor). Our portfolio analyses
enable comparisons between different types of specialized and diversified lenders. In this way
we can assess the extent to which small business lenders are diversified relative to other
specialized lenders. Data inputs for the computation of the efficient frontiers for the five bank
asset size groups are the mean quarterly rates of return on equity from 1994 to 2001 (n = 32)
for each of seven categories of lenders (i.e., small business, large business, real estate,
consumer, agricultural, diversified lenders, and a random sample of banks).
III.

Empirical Results
A.
ROA Profit Analyses
Univariate Results. Tables II and III report the univariate tests of small business
lending and ROA, respectively. Results are broken down by the decile grouping of banks in
terms of small business lending (i.e., banks in decile 10 make the most small business loans as
a proportion of total assets in the banking industry). Variables are averaged over the sample
period 1994-2001.
Table II gives the mean small business lending for each decile and bank size group. It
is interesting to observe that banks in the highest decile devoted about 20 percent of their total
assets to small business lending. This result was true for all bank size groups. Other
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percentage holdings of small business loans for each decile are similar across bank size groups.
Thus, we infer that, contrary to the common argument that small businesses are forced to rely
on small banks for their credit needs, large banks play an important role in the provision of
credit to the small business sector.
Casual inspection of Table III suggests that, within the same size category, average
bank rates of return on assets (ROA) decline as small business lending increases. 3 T-tests for
mean differences between decile groupings of banks within the same size category demonstrate
that this relationship is highly significant (at the one percent level) in most cases across the five
bank size groups and for all banks. Because these tests do not control for differences in other
variables, especially bank risk, no definitive inferences about how small business lending
affects bank profitability can be made at this point.
Multivariate Results. Table IV reports the fixed-effects panel regression findings for
the years 1994 to 2001 using ROA as the dependent variable. In Table IV alternative models
labeled 1-4 were run to comprehensively test small business lending and diversification effects
on bank profitability. Model 1 is a simple model. Model 2 incorporates a size dummy
(SIZEDUM) to control for differences in size calculated by deflating total assets to 1994 dollars
using the urban Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).4 Model 3 includes interaction variables
between the size dummy variables and the SMALLBUS variable to allow the effect of
exposure to small business loans to vary by size group. Model 4 contains interaction variables
between the size dummy variables and the DIVERS variable to test how asset diversification of
banks affects their profitability in each size group.
The results reported in Table IV generally support the specialization hypothesis. The
variable SMALLBUS is in all models positive and normally statistically significant. Also, the
DIVERS variable is also consistently positive and significant, which means that less diversified
banks tended to have higher profitability. Model (1) reveals that, after controlling for risk and
other factors, ROA decreases as bank size increases (i.e., a negative and significant SIZE
coefficient at the 0.01 level). Model (2) shows that the smallest size group, which is the
default group, performs the best in generating profits per unit of assets (ROA). The difference
in earning magnitudes is especially significant between the default group and the second
smallest group. Model (3) provides results for the interaction between the size dummy
variables and the SMALLBUS variable. As shown there, small business exposure tends to
have either neutral or positive effects on bank ROA. Smaller banks have a significant
interaction coefficient for the interaction between SIZEDUM1 and SMALLBUS at the 0.01
level. Finally, results for model (4) indicate that diversification has mixed effects on bank
ROA across the bank size categories. Diversification tends to lower ROA among small banks
(i.e., positive and significant interaction coefficient for SIZEDUM1 and DIVERS), but it is
associated with higher ROA among larger banks (i.e., negative and significant SIZEDUM3 and
DIVERS coefficient). Thus, it appears that diversification benefits increase as bank size
increases.
3

We also document similar univariate tests for the ROE. The results of ROE confirm the ROA findings – that is,
especially for very small banks, small business lending tends to lower bank profitability. The ROE results are
available upon request from the authors.
4
The size dummy variables are created by dividing the sample into by five different assets size: (1) less than $100
million (very small), (2) $100-$300 million (small), (3) $300-$500 million (medium), (4) $500 million-$3 billion
(large), and (5) greater than $3 billion (very large). The dummy variable is coded so that the smallest group of
banks is the control group (i.e., a value of 0).
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Other variables with significant estimated coefficients indicate that banks with higher
ROA profitability tended to have lower equity capital, more off-balance sheet activities, and
lower purchased funds. Another result worth mentioning is significantly higher profits
associated with increased exposure to securities investment. The conventional wisdom is that
higher investments in securities can diminish the profitability of a bank due to opportunity cost
of funds held in lower-yield investments. Also, the weak positive association between profit
and the concentration index (HHI) suggests that higher banking market concentration tended to
increase bank profitability, which could be explained by possibly lower competition in markets
dominated by a relatively few large banks. Overall, we infer that specializing in small business
lending positively affected banks’ ROA across bank size groups, especially within the smallest
bank size group. Relatedly, diversification tended to negatively affect bank profits, with the
exception of larger banks.
Robustness Test for Multivariate Results. As a robustness test, we re-ran the
multivariate regression analyses using: (1) a balanced sample that requires data for each bank
is available for all sample years 1994-2001, and (2) the Hurber/White sandwich estimator of
variance which adjusts for heteroskedasticity. Available upon request from the authors, the
results are virtually the same as in Table IV for the unbalanced sample.
B.
ROE Efficient Frontier Analyses
Here we report the results for efficient frontiers computed from quarterly rates of return
on equity (ROE). Seven categories of lenders are employed: (1) agricultural lenders, (2)
balanced (or diversified) lenders, (3) large business lenders (greater than $250,000 loan
concentrations), (4) consumer lenders, (5) real estate lenders, (6) small business lenders (less
than $250,000 loan concentrations), and (7) random sample (or diversified) lenders (n = 75
banks for a particular size group). Efficient frontiers are computed for each size group.
Comparison of the location of each type of lender under the efficient frontier yields the risk and
return characteristics of small business oriented lenders compared those of other specialized
and diversified lenders. To conserve space efficient frontiers for only the smallest and largest
size groups are reported. However, detailed results on expected equity returns and the
probability of failure for each lender category derived from efficient frontier analyses are
reported Table V.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the efficient frontier for very small banks with less than
$100 million in total assets. The location of each type of lender is shown relative to the
efficient frontier. Assuming an intercept of –1, a ray from the intercept to each of the six
categories of specialized lenders can be visualized. As mentioned before, the slope of this ray
can be used to compute the probability of bankruptcy for a particular type of specialized lender.
Table V contains the probability of failure results for each of the five bank size groups.
The “lender type” columns give the results for a line drawn through the lender point B in
Figure 1, while “efficient frontier” columns report the results for a line connecting a
hypothetical bank with the same expected ROE but which is fully diversified and lies on the
efficient frontier at point A in Figure 1. Two probabilities of failure are shown for each type of
lender. The difference between these two probabilities of failure represents the increase in
failure risk due to being a particular type of lender relative to the efficient frontier, holding
expected return constant.
Among very small banks, as discussed above with respect to Figure 2, small business
lenders had the lowest probability of failure compared to the five other types of lenders. Table
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V shows that the probability of failure among these banks was only 0.050 percent, or a failure
rate of about five banks out of 10,000 (i.e., there were between 8,000 and 11,000 banks in our
sample period). They also had the lowest average quarterly ROE. Hence, small business
lenders had lower equity risk and return compared to other types of lenders. Also, they are
close to the efficient frontier, as the decrease in probability of failure due to lying on the
efficient frontier is only 0.0036. These results indicate that very small banks specializing in
small business loans are relatively well diversified.
The highest risk and return lenders among very small banks were consumer-oriented
banks. These banks had failure rates of about 10 banks out of 10,000, which is almost twice
the failure risk of small business lenders. Consumer banks lie on the efficient frontier and
represent the right most point of the frontier. This means that they have the highest expected
return among portfolios on the efficient frontier. Other types of lenders had failure rates
between those for small business lenders and consumer lenders and were less well diversified
in terms of larger differences in failure probabilities relative to fully diversified banks on the
efficient frontier. Notice that balanced and random sample lenders were not necessarily more
fully diversified than other specialized lenders. As such, we infer that the major source of
diversification benefits is not lending across different types of loans per se; instead, geographic,
economic sector, and perhaps idiosyncratic differences among borrowers are more important
sources of loan portfolio diversification.
Figure 3 shows that efficient frontier results for very large banks. Here again we find
that small business lenders (consumer lenders) are the lowest (highest) risk and return loan
portfolios. Those banks with higher proportions of small business lending had the lowest
probability of failure (i.e., about 0.1453). Notice also that large business lenders had low risk
and return similar to small business lenders. By contrast, balanced lenders were relatively far
from the efficient frontier, which means that they were less well diversified than the other
lender groups (with the exception of real estate lenders).
Summarizing other findings in Table V:


Among small banks in size group 2, real estate and large business lenders are the
highest risk in terms of failure probability among different types of lenders but now
consumer lenders are the lowest risk, with failure rates of about 10 banks out of
10,000. Notice also that agricultural, balanced, and random sample lenders had low
expected failure rates similar to consumer lenders.
 Among medium-sized banks in size group 3, large business lenders are lowest in
risk and consumer lenders are again the highest risk. Small business lenders appear
to have average risk among different kinds of small and medium sized banks.
 Compared to other bank size groups, very large multi-billion dollar banks in size
group 5 tended to have the highest lender type probabilities of failure in the range of
14 to 22 banks per 10,000 banks. This range is higher than the riskiest very small or
small bank lender categories with assets under $300 million. We infer that small
banks are fairly well diversified relative to large banks.
The latter finding contradicts the popular notion that large banks are more diversified and lower
risk than small banks. It is likely that small banks obtain substantial diversification benefits by
providing loans to a variety of types of small business firms and other small borrowers. Simply
increasing the size of individual loans does not necessarily offer diversification benefits to large
banks.
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In sum, for small and large banks, efficient frontier analyses of ROE demonstrate that
small business lending boosts bank profitability per unit risk relative to other loan portfolio
compositions primarily by means of reducing failure risk. Importantly, small business lenders
are well-diversified institutions, which explains their low failure risk. These results are
consistent with earlier ROA profit findings based on panel regression analyses.
IV.

Conclusions
This paper has examined the question of how small business lending affects bank
profitability. Two opposing views in terms of the theoretical effects of specialized lending on
bank profitability are tested. The specialization hypothesis argues that banks focusing their
loan activities in a particular area take advantage of management expertise, quality loan
monitoring, and lower diseconomies of scope that lower operating costs. This hypothesis
would predict higher profitability among banks specializing in small business loans.
Alternatively, the diversification hypothesis is grounded in modern portfolio theory, which
implies that holding a variety of different types of loans will reduce risk and, holding profit
constant, increase profits per unit risk. This hypothesis would predict that banks specializing in
small business loans forego the risk-reducing benefits of diversification and, therefore, have
lower profitability.
Our empirical analyses were divided into two parts: (1) multivariate panel regression
tests of how small business lending affects banks’ rate of return on assets (ROA), and (2)
efficient frontier analyses of how small business lending affects banks’ rate of return on equity
(ROE) and associated failure risk. The panel regression results indicated that small business
lending had either little (or no) effect or a positive effect on ROA across different bank size
groups. Relatedly, diversification in a variety of loan categories tended to negatively affect
bank profits, with the exception of larger banks. The efficient frontier analyses revealed that
small business lending is associated with higher ROEs per unit risk due to lowering of bank
failure risk. Thus, we conclude that the evidence supports the specialization hypothesis, rather
than the diversification hypothesis. Small business lenders reap benefits from specialization,
particularly in terms of reducing failure risk. Our results provide empirical evidence in favor of
Winton’s argument that overly-diversified lenders may well have higher risk than specialized
lenders. The results further showed that, compared to a well-diversified portfolio, other
specialized lenders are also better positioned in risk-return profile.
We conclude that small business lending normally does not have a negative effect on
bank profitability – either neutral or positive effects are the norm. Interestingly, while it is
commonly believed that small business lending is risky, we find it tends to reduce bank failure
risk for many banks regardless of their asset size. If larger, more diversified organizations are
the future of the banking industry, small business lending can play a positive role in terms of
contributing to bank profitability and failure risk reduction. Consequently, despite the on-going
consolidation movement in the U.S. banking industry, banks likely will continue to play a
central role in the provision of small business credit.
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Table I
Definitions of variables
Profitability:
ROA
ROE
Focus:
SMALLBUS
Diversification:
DIVERS

Rate of return on assets, or net income after taxes to total assets
Rate of return on equity, or net income after taxes to total equity

Small business loans (commercial and industrial loans and commercial real estate
loans under $250,000) to total assets
A diversification measure using HHI (i.e., the sum of squared ratios of a loan
category/total loans for business loans, real estate loans, consumer loans, and
agricultural loans).

Risk and other control variables:
LOSS
Loan and lease charge-offs minus recoveries to total assets
EQUITY
Tier l (core) capital, or total equity to total assets
OFFBAL
Total off-balance sheet activities to total assets
SECURITIES
Total securities to total assets
PURCHASED Purchased funds, or large time deposits plus other borrowed money, to total assets
HHI
Herfindahl index for the county or SMSA in which bank is located
SIZE
Log of total assets deflated to 1994 dollars using the urban Consumer
Price Index (CPI-U)
Other lending specialization definitions:
LARGEBUS
Large business loans (commercial and industrial loans and commercial real estate
loans more than $250,000) to total assets
REALESTATE Total real estate loans excluding small business real estate loans under $250,000
to total assets
CONSUMER
Total consumer loans to total assets
AGLOAN
Total agricultural loans to total assets
__________________________________________________________________________________
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Table II
Average small business loans/total assets (SMALLBUS) for U.S. commercial banks in the
period June 1994-June 2001: Means and t-tests for decile rankings by small business lending
activity and bank asset size groups (in percent)

Decile
1
2-3
4-7
8-9
10
All

<$100
Mean
n
0.00
6,632
0.00 12,228
4.03 12,825
12.37
6,857
21.05
4,848
5.50 43,390

$100-$300
Mean
n
0.00
447
0.00
1,759
5.39
8,644
12.16
5,806
19.52
2,053
8.40 18,709

Assets in Millions
$300-$500
$500-$3000
Mean
n
Mean
n
0.00
23
0.00
38
0.00
105
0.00
151
5.83 2,295
5.04 3,442
11.87 1,029 11.58
580
19.35
162 20.13
82
7.95 3,614
5.99 4,293

>$3000
Mean
n
0.00
8
0.00
54
2.88 1,387
11.41
25
20.81
4
2.95 1,478

All Banks
Mean
n
0.00
7,148
0.00 14,297
4.65 28,593
12.21 14,297
20.55
7,149
6.36 71,484

t-Tests for Mean Differencesab
Assets in Millions
Decile Comparisons
<$100
$100-$300
$300-$500 $500-$3000
1 vs. 10
-292.18*** -230.57***
-44.47***
-19.77***
2 and 3 vs. 8 and 9
-573.49*** -528.10*** -224.59***
-172.79***
1, 2, 3 vs. 8, 9, 10
-312.57*** -306.56*** -122.38***
-71.57***
a
Not available (na) due to small sample sizes.
b
Asterisks indicate the level of significance: *--.10, **--.05, and ***--.01.

>$3000
na
-31.66***
-16.61***

All Banks
-358.92***
-824.66***
-435.94***
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Table III
Average rates of return on assets (ROA) for U.S. commercial banks in the period June 1994June 2001: Means and t-tests for decile rankings by small business lending activity and bank
asset size groups (in percent)

Decile
1
2-3
4-7
8-9
10
All

<$100
Mean
n
0.61
0.66
0.61
0.43
0.43
0.58

6,632
12,228
12,825
6,857
4,848
43,390

$100-$300
Mea
n
n
0.75 447
0.71 1,759
0.59 8,644
0.60 5,806
0.59 2,053
0.61 18,709

Assets in Millions
$300-$500
$500-$3000
Mea
n
Mean
n
n
1.02 23
0.91 38
1.07 105
1.29 151
0.66 2,295
0.64 3,442
0.62 1,029
0.61 580
0.23 162
0.68 82
0.66 3,614
0.66 4,293

>$3000
Mean
n
1.95
0.84
0.68
0.69
0.69
0.70

8
54
1,387
25
4
1,478

All Banks
Mean
n
0.63
0.68
0.62
0.52
0.48
0.60

7,148
14,297
28,593
14,297
7,149
71,484

t-Tests for Mean Differencesab
Assets in Millions
Decile Comparisons
<$100
$100-$300
$300-$500 $500-$3000
1 vs. 10
10.37***
2.55**
1.41
1.96*
2 and 3 vs. 8 and 9
11.46***
6.78***
3.58***
2.83***
1, 2, 3 vs. 8, 9, 10
14.82***
6.66***
3.85***
3.08***
a
Not available (na) due to small sample sizes.
b
Asterisks indicate the level of significance: *--.10, **--.05, and ***--.01.

>$3000
na
1.03
2.02**

All Banks
9.12***
9.42***
12.43***
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Table IV
Fixed-effects panel regression model results for U.S. commercial bank profits (ROA) and small
business lending in the period 1994-2001 (t statistics in parenthesesa)
Independent variables

Model 1

LOSS

-.0679
(-1.24)
-.0223
(-3.99)***
.00004
(9.05 )***
.0046
(1.71)*
-.0068
(-1.63)
.0080
(1.90)*
.0035
(1.75)*
-.0056
(-8.47)***
.0106
(2.88)***

EQUITY
OFFBAL
SECURITIES
PURCHASED
SMALLBUS
HHI
LNTA
DIVERS
SIZEDUM1
SIZEDUM2
SIZEDUM3
SIZEDUM4

Alternative Models
Model 2
Model 3

Model 4

-.0753
(-1.38)
-.0131
(-2.38)**
.00004
(9.02)***
.0059
(2.17)**
-.0162
(-3.95)***
.0074
(1.76)*
.0017
(0.83)

-.0733
(-1.34)
-.0133
(-2.40)**
.00004
(8.97)***
.0061
(2.23)**
-.0157
(-3.81)***
.0025
(0.55)
.0016
(0.83)

-.0727
(-1.33)
-.0134
(-2.40)**
.00004
(9.00)***
.0066
(2.28)**
-.0166
(-4.04)***
.0076
(1.82)*
.0015
(0.77)

.0069
(1.89)*
-.0026
(-3.05)***
-.0024
(-1.47)
-.0025
(-1.19)
-.0024
(-0.62)

.0072
(1.97)**
-.0054
(-4.37)***
-.0040
(-1.52)
-.0037
(-1.36)
-.0046
(-0.90)
.0289
(3.13)***
.0169
(0.66)
.0126
(0.49)
.0423
(0.42)

.0079
(1.66)*
-.0048
(-3.39)***
-.0015
(-0.60)
.0021
(0.74)
.0010
(0.22)

SIZEDUM1 * SMALLBUS
SIZEDUM2 * SMALLBUS
SIZEDUM3 * SMALLBUS
SIZEDUM4 * SMALLBUS
SIZEDUM1 * DIVERS

11,788

11,788

11,788

.0106
(1.85)*
-00035
(-0.41)
-.0182
(-2.18)**
-.0106
(-1.12)
11,788

F-statistics

20.13***

9.89***

8.03***

8.21***

Adjusted R2

0.1950

0.1941

0.1943

0.1943

SIZEDUM2 * DIVERS
SIZEDUM3 * DIVERS
SIZEDUM4 * DIVERS
Number of panels

a

Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: *--.10, **--.05, and ***--.01.
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Table V
Expected equity return and bank failure risk by lending type and bank size groupa

Agricultural Lenders (1)
Balanced Lenders (1)
Large Business Lenders (1)
Consumer Lenders (1)
Real Estate Lenders (1)
Small Business Lenders (1)
Random Sample (1)

Expected
Equity
Return
0.0690
0.0651
0.0587
0.0702
0.0654
0.0519
0.0585

Lender
Type
Standard
Deviation
0.0287
0.0296
0.0286
0.0333
0.0305
0.0236
0.0260

Lender
Type
Probability
of Failure
0.0721
0.0772
0.0729
0.0968
0.0819
0.0503
0.0603

Efficient
Frontier
Standard
Deviation
0.0271
0.0252
0.0231
0.0333
0.0253
0.0228
0.0230

Efficient
Frontier
Probability
of Failure
0.0642
0.0559
0.0476
0.0968
0.0563
0.0467
0.0472

Difference
in Probability
of Failure
0.0079
0.0213
0.0253
0
0.0256
0.0036
0.0131

Agricultural Lenders (2)
Balanced Lenders (2)
Large Business Lenders (2)
Consumer Lenders (2)
Real Estate Lenders (2)
Small Business Lenders (2)
Random Sample (2)

0.0822
0.0787
0.0626
0.0792
0.0815
0.0817
0.0783

0.0349
0.0346
0.0377
0.0345
0.0392
0.0362
0.0353

0.1040
0.1029
0.1259
0.1022
0.1314
0.1120
0.1071

0.0348
0.0320
0.0296
0.0322
0.0336
0.0337
0.0318

0.1034
0.0880
0.0762
0.0890
0.0965
0.0971
0.0870

0.0006
0.0149
0.0497
0.0132
0.0349
0.0149
0.1546

Agricultural Lenders (3)
Balanced Lenders (3)
Large Business Lenders (3)
Consumer Lenders (3)
Real Estate Lenders (3)
Small Business Lenders (3)
Random Sample (3)

0.0879
0.0825
0.0828
0.0933
0.0885
0.0880
0.0874

0.0388
0.0365
0.0348
0.0462
0.0391
0.0382
0.0405

0.1272
0.1137
0.1033
0.1786
0.1290
0.1233
0.1387

0.0380
0.0348
0.0348
0.0462
0.0385
0.0381
0.0376

0.1220
0.1033
0.1033
0.1786
0.1251
0.1226
0.1196

0.0052
0.0104
0
0
0.0039
0.0007
0.0191

Agricultural Lenders (4)
Balanced Lender (4)
Large Business Lenders (4)
Consumer Lenders (4)
Real Estate Lenders (4)
Small Business Lenders (4)
Random Sample (4)

0.0927
0.0876
0.0881
0.0962
0.0924
0.0861
0.0861

0.0414
0.0377
0.0385
0.0430
0.0403
0.0370
0.0370

0.1435
0.1202
0.1252
0.1539
0.1361
0.1161
0.1161

0.0403
0.0376
0.0378
0.0430
0.0402
0.0370
0.0399

0.1360
0.1195
0.1207
0.1539
0.1354
0.1161
0.1335

0.0075
0.0007
0.0045
0
0.0007
0
-0.0174

Lender Type (Size Groups 1-5)

Agricultural Lenders (5)
0.1016
0.0461
0.1751
0.0447
0.1647
0.0104
Balanced Lenders (5)
0.1017
0.0478
0.1882
0.0448
0.1654
0.0228
Large Business Lenders (5)
0.0941
0.0417
0.1453
0.0415
0.1439
0.0014
Consumer Lenders (5)
0.1169
0.0520
0.2168
0.0520
0.2168
0
Real Estate Lenders (5)
0.0976
0.0472
0.1849
0.0430
0.1535
0.0314
Small Business Lenders (5)
0.0938
0.0417
0.1453
0.0415
0.1439
0.0014
Random Sample (5)
0.1006
0.0454
0.1702
0.0443
0.1620
0.0082
a
Bank size groups are defined as follows: (1) less than $100 million (very small), (2) $100-$300 million (small),
(3) $300-$500 million (medium), (4) $500 million - $3 billion (large), and (5) greater than $3 billion (very large).
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Figure 1
Portfolio analysis, loan specialization, and the probability of bankruptcy
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Figure 2
Efficient frontier of return on equity (ROE) for very small banks with
less than $100 million in total assets (quarterly data 1994-2001)

25

26

Assessing the Profitability and Riskiness…(Kolari, Ou & Shin)

Figure 3
Efficient frontier of return on equity (ROE) for very large banks
more than $3 billion in total assets (quarterly data 1994-2001)

